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Abstract
Event studies of market efficiency measure an earnings surprise with the consensus error
(CE), defined as earnings minus the average of professional forecasts. However, indi-
vidual forecasts can be biased. CE and traditional robust statistics such as medians are
not robust to such bias. We prove and show empirically that the fraction of forecasts
that miss on the same side (FOM), by ignoring the size of the misses, is a more robust
parameter-free estimate. It performs better than an approach that estimates and ad-
justs for individual forecast bias. We bound FOM ’s efficiency relative to a benchmark
where bias parameters are known.
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1 Introduction
Economists historically measure the degree to which the market is surprised by an earnings
announcement with the consensus error. It is a simple parametric-free measure defined as
the difference between the actual earnings and the consensus forecast, where the consensus
is calculated using the mean of the available professional forecasts. The consensus error
is widely used in financial markets. For instance, commentaries frequently allude to the
extent to which earnings missed the consensus forecast as a key rationale for significant
stock price movements. The consensus error is also a building block of event studies on how
efficiently markets react to earnings news (see MacKinlay (1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai
(1999), Kothari and Warner (2004)).
A canonical regression specification in such event studies is that of the cumulative ab-
normal return of a stock around the earnings announcement date (CAR) or subsequent to
the announcement date (POSTCAR) on the consensus error (CE): the more positive the
consensus error CE the higher is the CAR and also the higher is the POSTCAR (see, e.g.,
Bernard and Thomas (1990)). These regressions indicate that markets react to earnings news
gradually and have become a linchpin in the market efficiency debate (see Fama (1998)).
The ubiquitous use of this measure is premised on the consensus forecast being an un-
biased measure of the market’s expectation of earnings. But it is well known that a subset
of professional earnings forecasts can sometimes be biased for a few reasons. One reason is
conflicts of interest. For instance, the analysts of investment banks that have business with
a company are likely to issue optimistically biased forecasts compared to peers working for
banks without such a relationship (Michaely and Womack (1999), McNichols and O’Brien
(1997), Lin and McNichols (1998), Lim (2001), Hong and Kubik (2003)). Another might
be that it is optimal for analysts to strategically shade their forecasts, whether positively or
negatively, away from their unbiased signal if the rewards to the forecasting tournament are
sufficiently convex (see, e.g., Keane and Runkle (1998), Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000),
DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2009)).
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Since many investors, particularly institutions which comprise a significant fraction of
the market, attempt to adjust for these strategic forecast biases in forming their earnings ex-
pectations (see, e.g., Iskoz (2003), Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Mikhail, Walther,
and Willis (2007)), the end result is that the consensus forecast is no longer an unbiased
measure of the market’s expectation of earnings. In other words, the consensus forecast by
averaging in biased analyst forecasts systematically diverges from the true expectation of the
market. In the context of the CAR and POSTCAR regressions, we ideally want an accurate
and unbiased measure of the true market surprise on the right-hand side as the explana-
tory variable. If CE as a proxy for the true market surprise has substantial measurement
error, this translates into poor explanatory power for CAR or POSTCAR in these canonical
regressions, thereby leaving room for a better measure of the true market surprise.
The challenge from the point of view of the econometrician is how construct this better
measure, which has the same advantage of being parametric-free as the consensus error but
at the same time takes as given that the econometrician does not have the same information
set as institutional investors. The usual robust statistics such as medians or winsorization
cannot help much since these statistics are meant to deal with outliers and not systematic bias
of forecasts. Importantly, it is difficult in practice to identify ex-ante which of the individual
forecasts are compromised, i.e. to estimate the bias of different analysts, as we show below.
Otherwise, one could pursue a parametric-dependent method, such as subtracting off the
estimated bias parameters from the contaminated individual forecasts before calculating the
consensus error.
To deal with this problem, we propose a new market surprise measure that is significantly
more robust to such bias — the fraction of forecasts that miss on the same side or FOM,
which shares the strength of CE in that it is parametric-free but is less sensitive to such
biased forecasts and hence potentially superior to CE. Suppose that there are N forecasts
and K is the number of forecasts less than the actual announced earnings A and M is the
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number of forecasts greater than A. Then the fraction of misses on the same side is given by
FOM =
K
N
− M
N
,
which takes on values between -1 and 1—the higher is FOM the more positive the earnings
surprise. For instance, when K = M , then FOM = 0 and there are equal misses on both
sides. When K = N and M = 0, then FOM = 1 and the actual lies above the range of
forecasts, which we will also denote by IActual>All = 1 (0 otherwise). In this case, the market
is positively surprised and market returns positive around the announcement date. When
K = 0 and M = N , FOM = −1 and everyone misses above the actual, which we also denote
by IActual<All = 1 (0 otherwise) and the market is negatively surprised and market returns
negative around the announcement date.
We show below by using a simple model that FOM better measures the true surprise
than CE when the bias of some forecasts are potentially large and unobservable to the
econometrician. When these biased errors are not a big concern, then CE is more accurate
than FOM. In this model, we discuss why FOM is better than a number of alternatives
such as using median instead of mean forecasts or winsorization in the presence of outliers.
We use earnings forecasts to frame our model and motivate our empirical analysis but the
methodology and ideas apply equally to other types of economic forecasts where bias is
potentially important.
First, to get an intuitive sense of why FOM is better than CE, consider the following
example. Suppose the market expectations for stock A’s and stock B’s earnings are both 10
and that there are N = 6 analysts making forecasts for each stock. If a significant fraction
of the forecasts are negatively biased, one might see forecasts like -11, -10, 9, 10, 11, and 12
for stock A and -10, -10, -10, 9, 10, and 11 for stock B. The large negative forecasts are the
biased ones. The mean consensus is 3.5 for stock A and 0 for stock B. Suppose the actual
earnings turns out to be 14 for both stock A and stock B. In other words, the true market
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surprise is 4 and the same for both stocks. But using the mean consensus, we get a CE of
10.5 for stock A and 14 for stock B. So using CE as a proxy, we would think there is more
of a positive surprise in stock B’s announcement than in stock A’s announcement, which is
an incorrect classification.
When we run the regression of CAR or POSTCAR on CE, in which CE is supposed to
be a proxy for the true earnings surprise, we suffer from measurement error and hence the
coefficient on CE will be downward biased. However, FOM is 1 for stock A and stock B, or
IActual>All = 1, which is the correct classification in terms of both stocks A and B having
the same true earnings surprise. Hence we expect that a regression of CAR or POSTCAR
on FOM to have superior explanatory power relative to CE.
Essentially, when some of the forecasts are biased enough, it is better to discard the
magnitudes of the misses and to simply count the fraction of misses on the same side. If
everyone misses on the same side, we know that even unbiased forecasts missed on the
same side as biased forecasts, which is enough to know that the market is truly surprised.
Taking into account magnitudes, as the traditional consensus error measure does, when some
forecasts are biased leads to sorting on bias as opposed to sorting on the true market surprise.
Second, observe that in the example above, using the median of the forecasts rather than
the mean as the consensus does not help the CE measure. For stock A, the consensus error
using the median is 4.5 for stock A and 14.5 for stock B which is a similarly bad classifi-
cation as using the mean consensus. Medians deal with outliers but not when a significant
fraction of the forecasts are biased. Third, in practice, event studies are implemented us-
ing a transformation of CE into a cross-sectional decile score from 1 to 10, which we call
Rank(CE). The Rank(CE) measure deals with outliers and offers a better fit for CAR and
POSTCAR than CE (see Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009)). But it is nonetheless weaker
than our FOM measure as these rankings are a form of winsorization and deal with outliers
but not biases which significantly affect the CE and the relative rankings of stocks that are
considered positive or negative surprises.
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Fourth, notice that the dispersion of forecasts in this example is also roughly equal for
both stocks A and B. As a result, our findings are not driven by differences in the dispersion
of forecasts across stocks and we show that this is indeed the case. As long as the fraction
of biased forecasts stays constant with N , such biases will remain important regardless of N
and we expect our FOM measure to be superior regardless of N .
Using annual forecasts of fiscal year-end earnings, the R2 of a canonical regression of
CAR (measured using the 3-day firm-size-adjusted return around the announcement date)
on CE is 0.30% and on its decile rank score Rank(CE) is 2.8%. CE is constructed using
the mean of the most recent forecasts for the annual year-end FY1 earnings. So every firm
has one observation per year over the sample period from 1983 to 2011. A one standard
deviation increase in Rank(CE) increases the CAR by 1.2%, a sizeable economic effect. For
POSTCAR, the portfolio long positive earnings surprise (decile rank score 10) and short
negative earnings surprise (decile rank score 1) yields a return of 1.7% over the subsequent
six months (126 trading days to be exact) after the announcement date or 3.5% annualized.
Our FOM variable, however, performs better than CE or Rank(CE). For instance, FOM
variable gives an R2 of 4.1%. A one standard deviation increase in FOM increases CAR by
1.5%. When we run a horse race of FOM and Rank(CE), the coefficient in front of FOM
is virtually unchanged whereas the one in front of Rank(CE) is no longer significant. For
the POSTCAR, a portfolio long FOM = 1 stocks and short FOM = −1 stocks yields a six-
month subsequent return of 3% or 6% annualized. Again, in a multiple regression to explain
POSTCAR, our FOM measure remains significant, whereas Rank(CE) is insignificant.
We verify that our findings remain robust even when controlling for differences in the
dispersion of forecasts across earnings events and that FOM works more consistently across
different sub-samples of analyst coverage. In addition, we show that FOM also predicts
revisions of the consensus forecast, although not as well as for stock returns, since the
consensus forecast includes some biased forecasts which presumably need not adjust since
they are driven by reasons other than accuracy. However, to the extent there are unbiased
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forecasters that adjust and learn from the announcement, we expect FOM to be informative
about these revisions, which it is.
Finally, we conduct two additional sets of analyses which speak to the efficiency of FOM
and the importance of having a parametric-free measure. First, we show that a parametric-
dependent method involving trying to estimate individual analyst bias parameters based
on their forecast histories and adjusting individual forecasts before calculating CE yields
significantly worse results than even using the parametric-free CE, and needless to say much
worst than FOM. Second, we provide a theoretical lower bound on the efficiency of CE
and FOM relative to a full information benchmark. That is, we can construct an optimal
measure of the consensus assuming we know individual bias parameters and precisions. Of
course, the relative efficiency of CE to this full information benchmark goes to zero when
the bias is large. But the lower bound on the relative efficiency FOM can be as high as 50%
using plausible parameter values.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We present a simple model to contrast the accuracy of
our FOM measure versus the traditional CE measure under various assumptions in Section
2. We describe our data and how we construct our key variables of interest in Section 3. We
present our main empirical findings in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. In the Appendix,
we collect proofs. In the Supplementary Internet Appendix, we provide further discussions
and extensions of our model to account for various aspects of the data.
2 Modeling the Performance of CE versus FOM
In this Section, we develop a stylized model to explain why FOM might be different from
CE and Rank(CE) in terms of its effectiveness in capturing market surprises. Our argument
relies on some fraction of analysts’ forecasts being biased but the bias is not known to the
econometrician. This is consistent with the empirical studies cited in the Introduction on the
incentive reasons for why analyst forecasts might be biased. We are able to obtain analytic
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solutions and prove that FOM is better than CE when the bias is large enough, which we
use to motivate our empirical work.
But for comparative statics, we need to use numerical calculations and will present these,
after presenting the empirical findings, in the Supplementary Internet Appendix on Exten-
sions and Simulations. Moreover, in this baseline model with bias, CE and Rank(CE) are
essentially the same object and our arguments work for both. But in the data, the cor-
relation of CE and Rank(CE) is very low due to outliers in CE. The Rank(CE) measure
largely takes care of these outliers. We will add this element of outliers to our model in the
Supplementary Internet Appendix so as to show that the effectiveness of FOM relative to
CE and Rank(CE) extends to a more general setting with outliers.
2.1 Set-up
We start by assuming that actual (which we refer to as earnings through out but could as
well be macro-variables like inflation or GDP) is given by
A = e+ A, (1)
where e is the unobserved market expectation and A ∼ N (0, σ2A). The difference between
the actual earnings and the market expectation is the market surprise, which is given by
S = A− e. (2)
We then assume that an individual forecast Fi is the market expectation e plus some
noise i and a possible bias term bi:
Fi =
 e+ i with prob. ω0e+ bi + i with prob. ω1 = 1− ω0 (3)
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where i ∼ N (0, σ2F ) and is uncorrelated with A. Each forecast is unbiased with probability
ω0, and is contaminated by an individual bias term bi with probability ω1 = 1− ω0.
We model the bias in the following manner. For each set of N forecasts an aggregated
bias level B ∼ N (0, σ2B) is drawn first, and conditional on this realized B individual bias
bi follows N (B, σ2b ). Note that while ω0 and ω1 are fixed and do not change with N , the
realized number of biased forecasts can be different from its expectation ω1N . Therefore
conditional on each set of N forecasts, on average a fraction of ω1 of them are biased by a
random magnitude. Note that we still have E[Fi] = e+ ω1E[bi] = e+ ω1E[B] = e because B
follows a symmetric distribution around zero.
We can motivate this set-up as the market is able to figure out which forecasts are biased
and has access to information about the mean of earnings e beyond simply using analyst
forecasts. A is the unexpected shock to earnings which the market cannot know. The bias
bi can be derived in a number of ways. The simplest is as in Lim (2001). We show in
the Supplementary Internet Appendix an extension where the market’s expectation depends
only on the analyst forecasts and we can derive similar results.
2.2 Definitions of CE and FOM
To construct our two proxies for market surprise, first note that the forecast error of the ith
forecaster is given by
Ui = A− Fi = S + Yi (4)
where
Yi ∼ ω0N (0, σ2F ) + ω1N (bi, σ2F ) (5)
is distributed as a mixture-normal of biased and unbiased forecasts. The consensus forecast
error (CE) then is simply the average of the forecast errors:
CE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ui. (6)
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In contrast, FOM is an average of the signs of the forecast errors:
FOM =
1
N
N∑
i=1
sgn(Ui), (7)
where sgn(Ui) is 1, 0, or −1, depending whether Ui > 0, Ui = 0 or Ui < 0.
2.3 Unbiased Forecasts Benchmark: ω1 = 0
We begin with Proposition 1 which describes the unbiased forecasts benchmark. The com-
parison we want to make is between Cor[CE, S] and Cor[FOM, S]. We can prove that in the
case where N is big, Cor[CE, S] > Cor[FOM, S], thereby making CE a better measure of the
earnings surprise S than FOM.
Proposition 1: Assume there is no bias (ω1 = 0). The correlation of the consensus
error CE with the true market surprise S is given by:
Cor[CE, S] =
1√
1 + r2F/N
, (8)
where rF = σF/σA is the ratio between the standard deviation of forecasts and the actual.
The correlation of FOM with S is
Cor[FOM, S] =
rFE[X · Φ(X)]√
E[Φ(X)(1− Φ(X))]/N + Var[Φ(X)] , (9)
where X ∼ N (0, 1/r2F ). CE is more correlated with S than is FOM when there is no bias
and N →∞).
Proof: See Appendix.
It is worth noting that (8) and (9) only depend on N and rF , namely the number of
analysts and the ratio between the standard deviation of the forecasts and the actual (rather
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than their respective uncertainty levels). It is obvious that when we take N →∞ in (8) for
any given rF , the correlation between CE and S increases with N and decreases with rF .
Indeed, as N gets large, Cor[CE, S] goes to 1 as one would expect from the Law of Large
Numbers. Also note that (9) goes to l(rF ) = rFE[X·Φ(X)]√
Var[Φ(X)]
as N →∞. The limit l(rF ) can be
shown to be strictly less than 1.
While it is analytically difficult to prove, we show using numerical calculations that
Cor[CE, S] > Cor[FOM, S] as one would expect when ω1 = 0 even for N set at realistic
values from data, typically between 5 and 20 forecasts. When there is no bias, there is no
reason to ignore the magnitude of misses.
2.4 Biased Forecasts: ω1 6= 0
We now show that ignoring the magnitudes of misses is advantageous when forecasts can be
biased and this bias potentially large in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Assume there is bias (0 < ω1 < 1). The correlation of CE with S is
given by:
Cor[CE, S] =
1√
1 + (r2F + ω0ω1r
2
B + ω1r
2
b )/N + ω
2
1r
2
B
, (10)
where rB = σB/σA and rb = σb/σA are the ratios between the standard deviation of the
aggregate and individual bias to the actual, respectively. Cor[CE, S] goes to 0 as rB gets
large, while Cor[FOM, S] is always bounded from below by
2ω0rFE[X · Φ(X)] > 0 (11)
where X ∼ N (0, 1/r2F ). Hence, FOM is more correlated with S than CE when rB the bias
→∞.
Proof: See Appendix.
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To get an intuition for this result, notice that the first claim follows from (10) by letting
the bias distortion parameter rB →∞. On the other hand, the lower bound for Cor[FOM, S]
is given by l(rF , ω0) = 2ω0rFE[X · Φ(X)] > 0. Although very crude, it does not involve the
bias components: no matter how bad the bias can be, at least a fraction of useful information
is preserved. Since Cor[CE, S] goes to 0 with increasing rB, for any value of ω1 ∈ (0, 1) it will
decrease to below l(rF , ω0) for a large enough rB. That is, whatever value other parameters
take, FOM will eventually outperform CE as the level of bias distortion increases.
3 Data
The data on analysts’ earnings forecasts are taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (I/B/E/S). We conduct our analysis using the Unadjusted Detailed files. We focus on
forecasts of the fiscal year-end earnings (FY1) from 1983 to 2011. Stock returns, prices, and
number of outstanding shares are drawn from the Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP) Daily Stocks file. The forecast data are merged with actual earnings obtained from
I/B/E/S and the daily stock price data from CRSP. Observations are dropped if forecast
data, earnings data, or stock data are missing.
For each analyst in a given forecast period, we restrict every forecast to be made within
90 days to the annual earnings announcements. If an analyst makes more than one forecast
within 90 days to the earnings announcement, we keep the latest forecast before the earnings
announcements. In some records, the revision date precedes the original forecast date, which
is considered an error on the part of I/B/E/S. In this case, we use the original forecast date.
We then calculate the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum value of
these individual forecasts for each stock in a given fiscal period. In addition, the FY1 earnings
announcements need to fall between 15 to 90 calendar days following the fiscal period end
date. Otherwise, we drop the observations.1 We remove penny stocks with a price of less
1We also consider forecasts of quarterly earnings of the same sample period as a robustness exercise. For
each analyst in a given forecast period, we keep the latest forecast before the quarterly earnings announce-
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than $5. To control for stock splits, we delete observations where the number of shares
outstanding at date t when the variables are calculated is larger than the number of shares
20 days prior to the earnings announcement. We also require an earnings announcement to
have at least 5 analyst forecasts.
Following the literature, we define consensus error (CE) as the difference between the
actual FY1 earnings and the consensus forecast scaled by the stock price 20 days prior to
the earnings announcement (price(-20)). We consider both mean consensus (arithmetic mean
across individual forecasts) and median consensus (50th percentile of individual forecasts) in
formulating CE. We sort CE into deciles and assign a rank score from 1 to 10 to CE based
on mean consensus. As for CE based on median consensus, which has a value of 0 for over
20% of the data, we apply a more coarse sort by ranking CE into only 6 groups. Analyst
forecast dispersion (DISP) is defined as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts scaled by
price(-20). We further sort DISP into deciles and assign a rank score from 1 to 10 to each
batch (Rank(DISP)).
We use two indicator functions, IActual<All and IActual>All, to denote when all analysts
completely miss on the same side. IActual<All equals 1 if the minimum forecast is higher than
the actual earnings. In this case, all analysts are being too positive and make forecasts higher
than the actual earnings. In contrast, IActual>All equals 1 if all analysts are too pessimistic
and the maximum forecast is lower than the actual earnings.
The fraction of misses (FOM) is defined as follows:
FOM =
K
N
− M
N
, (12)
where K is the number of forecasts strictly smaller than the actual earnings, and M is the
number of forecasts strictly greater than the actual earnings. N is the total number of analyst
forecasts for stock i. Notice that K + M does not necessarily equal N . By construction,
FOM equals 1 if IActual>All is 1 and -1 if IActual<All is 1.
ments. Relevant summary statistics based on qualified quarterly forecasts are then calculated.
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Using CRSP, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as follows:
CAR(i, y) =
t1∏
t=t0
(1 + (R(i, t)−R(p, t)))− 1, (13)
where R(i, t) is the daily returns of stock i on date t around an earnings announcement in
year y. The window to calculate the cumulative abnormal return begins at date t0 and ends
at date t1. R(p, t) is the daily return of the size portfolio to which stock i belongs. The size
deciles are based on CRSP Portfolio Statistics Capitalization Deciles file.
We concentrate on two time windows relative to earnings announcements. The first are
returns cumulated over the three-day window from one trading day before until one day after
the earnings release date (CAR). The second is the cumulative post-announcement returns
(POSTCAR) using trading days +2 to +126 after the earnings announcement.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables. In Panel A, notice that the CE
(using the mean consensus) has a mean of -0.0031, consistent with the positive bias in the
consensus forecast found in the literature, and a standard deviation of 0.043. The CE using
the median consensus has similar magnitudes. Rank(CE) using mean consensus has a mean
of 5.49 and a standard deviation of 2.87. Rank(CE) using median consensus has a mean
of 3.46 and a standard deviation of 1.7.2 Our FOM has a mean of .1454 and a standard
deviation of .7. IActual<All has a mean of 0.125 and IActual>All has a mean of 0.2. In other
words, everyone misses on the same side for 32% of the earnings announcement observations
in our sample. Moreover, notice that CE based on either median or mean consensus have a
correlation of 0.8447 with each other.
In Figure 1, we plot the distribution of FOM across the entire sample. On the x-axis are
the bins for various values of FOM. Notice that 12% of our sample is in the -1 bin (which
denotes IActual<All) and 20% in the 1 bin (which denotes IActual>All). For the bins in the
2The standard deviation of the Rank(CE) using the median consensus is smaller because as we noted
above we only use 1-6 groups as opposed to 1-10 deciles. The reason is that the median consensus has 20%
of the observations concentrated at 0.
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middle, we have a bin width of 0.25. The bins with positive FOM’s have 10% each of the
observations. The bins with negative FOM’s have a somewhat smaller representation at 5%
each.
In Figure 2, we show the FOM distribution conditional on the number of analysts N .
When N = 5 to N = 9, which represents 53% of the sample observations, the fraction of
observations where everyone misses on the same side is 39%. The analogous number for
N = 10 to N = 19, which is 35% of the sample, is 27%. The number for N ≥ 20, which is
12% of the sample, is 19%. In all these situations, the fraction of everyone missing on the
same side is a non-trivial fraction of the observations.
In Figure 3, it is also interesting to see that the time series of misses on the same side
varies over our period of study from 1983 to 2011. While the total misses on the same side
is consistently high at 30%, the misses all above the actual have been declining, while the
misses all below the actual have been increasing.
In Panel B of Table 1, we report the correlation matrix for our variables of interest in
which CE is based on the mean consensus. Notice that the correlation of CE with Rank(CE)
is 0.28 and the correlation of FOM and CE is .24. As we show in Section A.5 of the
Supplementary Internet Appendix, CE has fat-tails which drive down these correlations. The
correlation of FOM with Rank(CE) is higher at 0.81 but it is far from perfectly correlated. As
a result, it will be interesting to see which of these two measures is more informative for stock
returns. We will in our extended model below try to capture this difference in correlations
which is absent from our baseline model above. This distinction is not relevant for our main
empirical results but we show that our model can be extended to capture this additional
feature of the data. In any event, FOM will have different information about market surprises
than CE and Rank(CE). Results in Panel C using the median as the consensus forecast are
similar. One thing to note is that the outliers make CE not as effective a measure of market
surprises as Rank(CE). But FOM does better than both as we show below.
It is also useful to do a decomposition of FOM on firm and time characteristics. In a
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table which we omit for brevity, we report the R2 of FOM regressions on firm and year
dummies. We consider three models: (1) FOM on firm dummies only, (2) FOM on year
dummies only, and (3) FOM on firm and year dummies. The R2 for specification (1) is 0.12,
for specification (2) is 0.045, and for specification (3) is 0.14. In other words, firm fixed
effects or year dummies explain little of the variation in FOM. FOM is mostly driven by
idiosyncratic events, consistent with the premise of our model.
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 FOM and CAR
In Table 2, we run the canonical earnings announcement event study regression with CAR
as the dependent variable and various permutations of CE, FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All
as independent variables. All regressions include Year Dummies. In column (1), we see
that the coefficient on CE is positive as expected but the R2 is low at 0.3%. In column
(2) FOM attracts a coefficient of 0.0210 with a t-statistic of 33.86 and an R2 of 4.1%. A
one standard deviation increase in FOM increases CAR by 1.5%, which is a sizeable 3-day
move in stock returns. Using the everyone-misses-on-the-same-side measures, we find that
the coefficient in front of IActual<All is as expected negative with a coefficient of -0.021 and a
t-statistic of -15.21. For IActual>All , it is positive at 0.0265 with a t-statistic of 24.37. The
market’s reaction is fairly symmetric when everyone misses on the same side, whether it is
too high or too low. Again, the market reactions are sizeable — roughly a 2.1% decrease
in stock prices over 3 days when all analysts miss too high and a 2.6% 3-day increase when
all analysts miss too low. In column (4), we find that FOM is far more informative for
CAR than CE when we put both variables together in a multiple regression. The coefficient
of CE goes to zero while the coefficient in front of FOM is unchanged. It is in this sense
that FOM dominates CE. The same holds true in column (5) when we compare CE to the
everyone-misses-on-the-same-side indicators.
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In columns (6)-(10), we repeat the same specifications using the median of the forecasts
as the proxy for the consensus. In every case, the results are virtually unchanged. Using
the median consensus does not help for the reasons we gave above in that the issue is not so
much outliers but systemic bias which the median or winsorization more generally cannot
solve.
In Panel B, we compare the relative power of Rank(CE) and FOM for explaining CAR. In
column (1), we find that Rank(CE) attracts a coefficient of 0.004 with a t-statistic of 27.15.
The R2 is 0.028. As expected, it performs much better than CE because CE has outliers.
The coefficient in column (2) for FOM is the same as that of Panel A with an R2 of 0.041,
which is higher than that of Rank(CE). The coefficients in front of the everyone-misses-
on-the-same-side indicators in column (3) are the same as in Panel A. In column (4), when
we combine both of these explanatory variables, we see that the coefficient in front FOM is
largely unchanged, increasing from 0.021 to 0.0213 with a t-statistic of 20.45. The coefficient
for Rank(CE) is close to zero and is no longer significant. Moreover, the R2 remains the same
as when FOM is by itself in the regression. In column (5), we find that adding in a horserace
of Rank(CE) with the everyone-misses-on-the-same-side indicators, Rank(CE) retains more
explanatory power. This indicates that FOM does better than Rank(CE) not only when
everyone misses on the same side. There is also information not captured in Rank(CE) in
intermediate values of FOM.
In columns (6)-(10), we consider Rank(CE) but using the median forecast as the consensus
forecast. The coefficient in front of Rank(CE) is 0.008 with a t-statistic of 30.84 and an R2 of
0.035, which is better than Rank(CE) using mean forecasts. But when we combine Rank(CE)
with FOM, we see again that the coefficient in front of Rank(CE) falls to 0.00218 with a
t-statistic of 0.0028, while the coefficient in front of FOM is 0.0164 with a t-statistic of 13.89.
One way to compare the economic magnitudes is to ask how a one standard deviation
increase in Rank(CE) or FOM increases the CAR. For Rank(CE), its standard deviation is
1.7, while for FOM , it is .72. The implied CAR effect of Rank(CE) is just 0.0038 compared
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to the implied CAR effect for FOM, which is 0.014. The FOM effect is 3 to 4 times as large as
the Rank(CE) effect using the median forecast for the consensus. It is not surprising that the
R2 does not change much from the univariate FOM specification when we add Rank(CE). In
column (10), we combine the Rank(CE) and the everyone-misses-on-the-same-side measures.
The results are similar to the case of the mean consensus. So overall, while using a median
consensus in conjunction with taking a rank of CE improves performance, FOM is still the
best univariate measure by a substantial margin. This will become even more apparent when
we consider POSTCAR next.
But before then, it is helpful to visualize these regressions in Figure 4, where we plot the
average CAR for different values of Rank(CE) and in Figure 5, where we plot the average
CAR for the different bins of FOM. Notice that an effective earnings surprise measure
should generate a strong positive monotonic relationship between the measure on the x-
axis and CAR on the y-axis. In both cases, we see an upward sloping sloping curve. But
FOM actually generates a much bigger spread in CAR than Rank(CE)—from bin -1 to bin
1, we see a movement in the CAR of -0.021 to 0.0265, consistent with our estimates for
the everyone-misses-on-the-same-side indicators from Table 2. In contrast, Rank(CE) only
generates an analogous movement from decile 1 to decile 10 of -0.015 to 0.02 in CAR. Also,
Rank(CE) generates a much more muted increase in CAR for deciles scores 1 to 3.
4.2 FOM and POSTCAR
In Table 3, we have as the dependent variable POSTCAR. In Panel A, we compare FOM
to the unranked CE. In column (1), we see that CE again attracts a positive coefficient
of .606 but is not statistically significant. In column (2), the coefficient in front of FOM
is 0.0135 with a t-statistic of 6.27. In column (3), we see that the coefficients in front of
the indicators when everyone misses on the same side are -0.0137 with a t-statistic of 2.87
and 0.0151 with a t-statistic of 3.83. These two coefficients are economically interesting
since we can interpret these as the returns of shorting a portfolio where everyone misses
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too high (negative surprise) and longing a portfolio where everyone misses too low (positive
surprise). The six-month return is 3%, which translates to an annualized return of 6%, quite
an economically interesting magnitude. When we run the multiple regression, we see that
FOM is more informative about POSTCAR than CE. The coefficient in front of CE gets cut
dramatically, while the coefficient in front of FOM is virtually unchanged. In column (4), we
find that FOM best explains POSTCAR. A similar conclusion holds in column (5) with the
everyone-misses-on-the-same-side indicators. In column (6)-(10), we use the median forecast
to create CE and find virtually identical results.
In Panel B, we compare FOM to the Rank(CE) using means and medians for explaining
the POSTCAR. In column (1), we see that Rank(CE) comes in significantly with a coefficient
of 0.00188 and a t-statistic of 3.45. Columns (2) and (3) are the same as to those in Panel
A. In column (4), where we combine Rank(CE) and FOM, Rank(CE) has the wrong sign,
while the FOM is even more significant and in the right direction. The coefficient is 0.0229
with a t-statistic of 5.98. So here moving from an FOM of -1 to 1 would lead to an increase
in the POSTCAR of nearly 5% per six months or nearly 10% annualized. In column (5)
where we examine how the indicators of everyone-missing-on-the-same-side do compared to
Rank(CE), we see that Rank(CE) is no longer significant and the coefficient in front of
the indicators are virtually unchanged. In columns (6)-(10), we use the median forecast to
construct Rank(CE) instead of the mean forecast and find very similar results.
To visualize these POSTCAR regressions, we show in Figure 6 the average POSTCAR
for different values of Rank(CE) and in Figure 7 the average POSTCAR for the different
bins of FOM. Again, we want our earnings surprise measure to generate a monotonic or
upward sloping POSTCAR. Notice that FOM generates a much more upward-sloping and
monotonic POSTCAR than Rank(CE) and also generates a much more sizeable spread in
POSTCAR, consistent with Table 3.
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4.3 Controlling for Dispersion of Forecasts
In Table 4, we add into our baseline regression specifications the dispersion of analysts’
forecasts (DISP) and CE interacted with DISP to see if more complicated models of CE
might take away the explanatory power of FOM. The idea is that the effect of CE on
returns is lower when there is more uncertainty or disagreement in the forecasts.
Note that we have already established the power of FOM over CE and Rank(CE) in all
cases. It is interesting to nonetheless consider whether more complicated Rank(CE) models
might attenuate the univariate power of FOM. More precisely, we implement our regression
using Rank(DISP) and Rank(CE). This is indeed what we find since the coefficient in
front of the interaction term with DISP is negative. However, the coefficients on FOM
are little changed from before. The coefficients in front of IActual<All and IActual>All are also
significant. This is true for mean and median consensus forecasts. The overall picture is
that FOM remains significant throughout.
4.4 Cuts by Analyst Coverage
In Table 5, we run our baseline specifications for sub-groups of stocks with different levels
of analyst coverage. Recall that we require a minimum of 5 analysts to begin with. We
divide our sample into 4 groups: 5 to 9 analysts, 10 to 14 analysts, 15 to 19 analysts and
greater than or equal to 20 analysts. In Panel A, we consider the mean consensus. In the
first row, we see that the effect of Rank(CE) is fairly similar across all the sub-groups. FOM
also has fairly similar effects for all the sub-groups in the second row. But notice that in
each case, the R2 of FOM is higher than that of Rank(CE). So the baseline effects that we
established are not concentrated in a particular sub-group of stocks. The same applies for
the everyone-misses-on-the-same-side indicators in the third row. In fourth row, we run a
horse race between Rank(CE) and FOM and find again that Rank(CE) is not significant in
any of the sub-groups once we have FOM in the regression. The coefficients on FOM are in
contrast unchanged. In the fifth row, we run a horse race of Rank(CE) and the everyone-
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misses-on-the-same-side indicators. We obtain similar effects to the baseline; Rank(CE) is
weakened but not as much as if we had FOM in the regression.
In Panel B, we conduct the same analysis but now using the median consensus to calculate
Rank(CE). Our conclusions are largely similar. Interestingly, focusing on row (4) where we
run a horserace between Rank(CE) and FOM, we see that FOM does much better and
Rank(CE) is insignificant except for the N equals 5 to 9 case. In other words, recall from
our Table 2 Panel B that the Rank(CE)measure constructed by taking the median forecast as
the consensus did slightly better compared to the Rank(CE)measure using the mean forecast
as the consensus when compared to FOM. Whereas Rank(CE) using the mean forecast as
the consensus was entirely wiped out in the horserace, Rank(CE) using the median forecast
as the consensus survived a bit though the FOM effect was three times as big. We see here
that this differential was coming only from the group with the fewest analysts. For N big,
FOM is much better, which fits with the intuition we developed in the model. When there
is a big N , if everyone misses on the same side, it is very indicative that there was a big
surprise since even the unbiased forecasts are also missing on the same side. Recall that the
fraction of biased forecasts stays constant with N in our model and hence bias remains just
as important for N big as N small.
In Table 6, we consider the same exercise but using POSTCAR. Here the results are
noisier but we can still discern that FOM is much more robust than Rank(CE) in explaining
POSTCAR. In Panel A, we again use the mean forecast to calculate Rank(CE). Notice in the
first row, Rank(CE) is only sporadically significant across the four sub-groups. FOM in the
second row is much more consistent in its performance. In the third row, the indicators for
everyone-missing-on-the-same-side are also less consistent compared to FOM. In the fourth
row, we see that FOM takes out the significance of Rank(CE) in explaining POSTCAR. The
only significant coefficient for Rank(CE) goes the wrong way in the first sub-group.
However, for N greater than or equal to 20, even FOM has limited explanatory power. So
most of the power of FOM is coming from stocks with fewer analysts. This is not surprising
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since there is far less drift in stock prices for stocks with more analyst coverage to begin
with as these stocks are likely to be better arbitraged (see DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)) Of
course, also note that FOM does work very well for the sub-group with lots of analysts using
CAR since this captures the reaction of the market to the surprise. The POSTCAR is the
delayed reaction or inefficiency in the market. In Panel B, we reach very similar conclusions
for the POSTCAR.
4.5 FOM and Revision of Consensus
In Table 7, we compare the relative performance of Rank(CE) and FOM in explaining
revisions of analysts expectations (between two adjacent fiscal years) in the same direction
as market returns. In other words, if both Rank(CE) and FOM are picking up surprises, we
should see that positive surprises are followed by positive revisions of the consensus forecast.
But when it comes to comparing which is more powerful, any conclusion becomes more
involved since we know from our analysis that a subset of analyst forecasts are biased and
that these biased forecasts influence the consensus. So it really also depends on how the
biased analysts revise their expectations, which is difficult to say. In any event, since part of
the consensus is unbiased and similar to the market, we expect FOM to still have power to
predict the revision of the consensus. This is indeed what we find. If we look at the economic
significance of the coefficients in front of Rank(CE) and FOM and perform our comparative
statics of a one standard deviation shock to these two variables and see what it implies for
the consensus revision, we still find that FOM is stronger than Rank(CE) in both Panels
A and B. But the difference is far smaller than when it comes to predicting stock returns.
In sum, it is comforting that FOM and the everyone-misses-on-the-same-side indicators are
picking up revisions of the consensus.
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4.6 Additional Robustness Exercises
In our baseline results, we focus on forecasts for year-end earnings that has to be within 90
days before the announcement date. We obtain similar results when there are no such screens,
using quarterly instead of annual year-end earnings forecasts, and where the benchmark
excess return is the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) returns accounting for
size, book-to-market and momentum. These tables are omitted for brevity and can be
obtained from the authors.
4.7 Parametric-Dependent Alternative
Up to this point, we have focused on parametric-free measures, but one can consider a
parametric-dependent alternative. A natural approach is to find the optimal weights, which
minimize the square consensus error, for each individual forecast. To do so, we start by
breaking down square consensus error into bias and variance:
SCE =
(
N∑
i=1
ωibi
)2
+
N∑
i=1
ω2i σ
2
i = wbb
′w′ +w′Dw (14)
where SCE is the square consensus error, ωi is the optimal weight of individual forecast i,
bi is the bias of individual analyst i, and σ2i is the square debiased forecast error of analyst i,
and D = diag{σ21, σ22, ...., σ2n}. In this setting, we allow for heterogeneous individual forecast
precision as opposed to the above baseline model which assumed these were all equal.
To find wi, consider the following Lagrange function:
L(λ) = SCE − λw′1. (15)
By taking the first order derivative with respect to w, we get
2(bb′ +D)w − λ1 = 0, (16)
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which we can then use to solve for w as
w =
λ
2
(bb′ +D)−11. (17)
By applying the Sherman-Morrison formula, we can replace (bb′ +D)−1 with
(bb′ +D)−1 = D−1 − D
−1bb′D−1
1 + b′D−1b
, (18)
and w then becomes
w =
λ
2
D−11− λ
2 + 2b′D−1b
D−1bb′D−11. (19)
Therefore, for each ωi we have
ωi =
λ
2
(
1− bi
∑N
k=1 bkσ
−2
k
1 +
∑N
k−1 b
2
kσ
−2
k
)
σ−2i , i = 1, 2, ...., N. (20)
We can then calculate the optimal-weighted consensus as
∑N
i=1 ωiFi and optimal-weighted
consensus error (optimal-weighted CE).
Empirically, we estimate individual forecast bias (bi) by averaging their forecast errors
over the past T forecasting periods. That is,
bi =
1
T
−1∑
t=−T
(Fi,t − Actuali,t). (21)
We require each analyst to have at least 2 forecasts in the past 5 years. If an analyst does
not have a forecast history long enough (less than 2 observations over the past three years)
to estimate bi, we replace it with the mean bias, which is the sample average taken across all
available bi in fiscal year t. The variance of analyst i (σ2i ) is the individual square forecast
error:
σ2i = (Fi − Actuali − bi)2. (22)
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We repeat the same regressions as in Subsection 4.1 and 4.2 by replacing CE and
Rank(CE) with optimal-weighted CE and Rank(CE). The results are reported in Table 8
with regard to earnings announcement returns. First, notice that in Panel A, the parametric-
dependent CE is not statistically significant and performs actually worst than simply using
CE. The reason of course is that the bias and precision of the individual forecasts are esti-
mated with error and this can negate the advantage of trying to optimally adjust for these
parameters in calculating the consensus forecast. The point estimate on FOM in column (2)
is nearly identical to that of Table 2 but with a smaller t-statistic because we have fewer
observations as we require 5 years of initial data to calculate the bias and precision parame-
ters. In Panel B, we use the parametric-dependent Rank(CE) instead of Rank(CE) and we
obtain similar conclusions as before. In sum, the difficulty of estimating bias and precision
points to the value of a parametric-free method.
4.8 Relative Efficiency
In this final section, we provide a lower bound on the efficiency of FOM relative to a bench-
mark where we assume that the bias and precision parameters governing individual forecasts
are known. Recall that the earning surprise S ∼ N (0, σ2A) and the error of the ith forecast is
Ui = A− Fi = S + Yi, Yi ∼ ω0N (0, σ2F ) + ω1N (bi, σ2F ),
where ω1 = 1 − ω0, and bi’s are drawn from N (B, σ2b ) conditional on the realization of
B ∼ N (0, σ2B).
To probe the unobservable surprise S, we look for a measure that is highly correlated
with it. The ideal measure should be a function of Ui’s that satisfies the following,
f ∗ = arg max
f
|Cor(f(U1, U2, · · · , UN), S)|. (23)
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It is well-known that f ∗ is the nonlinear projection of S onto the space of Ui’s:
f ∗(U1, U2, · · · , UN) = E[S|U] with U = (U1, U2, · · · , UN). (24)
This conditional expectation can be written as
f ∗(U) = E[S|U] =
∫∞
−∞
∫∞
−∞ Sg(S,B,U)dSdB∫∞
−∞
∫∞
−∞ g(S,B,U)dSdB
, (25)
where g(S,B,U) is the joint density of S, B and U. It can be derived by integrating out
{bi} such that
g(S,B,U) = Cφ(S;σ2A)φ(B;σ
2
B)
N∏
i=1
[
ω0φ(Ui − S, σ2F ) + ω1φ(Ui − S −B, σ2F + σ2b )
]
, (26)
where C is a normalization constant, and φ(x;σ2) denotes the density function of N (0, σ2).
Note that in the previous section, we derived an optimal choice in the linear class of
functions and demonstrated that it did worse than using the parametric-free CE. The
optimal choice f ∗(U) in this more general derivation is highly nonlinear and cannot be
analytically derived. It depends on many unknown parameters (ω0, σ2B, σ2b , σ2F and σ2A).
But we can nonetheless provide a lower bound of the efficiency of our simple parameter-
free measure FOM relative to this optimal measure f ∗(U). Our derivation assumes that, for
a given set of N forecasts, we can condition on both U and additional information on the
subset of forecasts that are unbiased. We call this subset of unbiased forecasts A and denote
the size of this set by |A|, which is an integer between 0 (no forecasts are unbiased) and N
(all forecasts are unbiased).
That is, we are now considering any functions of h(U,A) (which also includes f ∗(U) as
a special case) to find a function that correlates better with S. If we add more information
(the unbiased subset A), the maximal achievable correlation with S using a function of U
and A should be larger:
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Cor[f ∗(U), S] ≤ max
h
Cor[S, h(U,A)]. (27)
We can calculate analytically the maximal correlation of the optimal h with S assuming
we can condition also on A. We will compare the relative efficiency of FOM to this maximal
correlation and it is in this sense that this is a lower bound since f ∗(U) need not generate
this maximal correlation.
Proposition 3. Let f ∗(U) be the optimal measure of the forecast error assuming all
parameters are known. The relative efficiency of FOM to the optimal but infeasible measure
f ∗(U) is given by
Cor[FOM, S]
Cor[f ∗(U), S]
. (28)
In the limit when bias approaches ∞,
lim
σ2B→∞
Cor[FOM, S]
Cor[f ∗(U), S]
≥ lim
σ2B→∞
Cor[FOM, S]
maxh Cor[S, h(U,A)]
=
2ω0E[ZΦ(Z/rF )]√
E
[
1
1+r2F /|A|
] , (29)
where A is the subset of unbiased forecasts in a given draw of N forecasts and |A| is the
size of the A. In contrast, the relative efficiency of CE can be seriously compromised in the
presence of bias,
lim
σ2B→∞
Cor[CE, S]
Cor[f ∗(U), S]
= 0.
The numerator of the third term in (29) can be evaluated analytically.3 Using this and
the fact that |A| ∼ Binomial (N,ω0) we can evaluate (29), which only depends on N , rF and
ω0.
3By taking derivative w.r.t. rF , we have ddrF E[ZΦ(Z/rF )] = − 1r2F E[Z
2φ(Z/rF )] = − 1√2pi ·
rF
(1+r2F )
3/2 .
Integrating the derivative back, we have E[ZΦ(Z/rF )] = 1√2pi · 1√1+r2F .
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Table 9 summarizes the numerical values of the lower bound for N = 10, which is a typical
number of forecasts, and various values of w0 (the fraction of unbiased forecasts) and rF (the
ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’ forecast errors to the standard deviation of the
earnings shock). The relative efficiency increases with w0, holding fixed rF . The relative
efficiency increases with rF holding fixed w0. Recall again that this lower bound assumes
we know exactly which subset of forecasts are unbiased. But even against this unrealistic
benchmark, FOM can be relatively efficient when w0 is not too small, that is when not
too many forecasts are biased, and rF low, that is when analyst forecasts errors are not
too variable relative to the actual earnings uncertainty. Reasonable values for w0 ought to
be between 0.7 to 0.9. That is, 10% to 30% of the analysts forecasting are biased from
incentives or conflicts of interest. For rF , parameters values around .5 to 2 seem plausible
as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts are on par with how much actual uncertainty
there is about the stock. At these parameter values, the lower bound is .5. That is, FOM, the
parametric-free measure achieves roughly 50% of the efficiency as a measure conditioning on
knowing all the parameter values and also the set of unbiased forecasts for any given draw.
5 Conclusion
An important part of event studies of earnings announcements is capturing whether or not
the market is surprised. The traditional measure is the difference between realized earnings
and the consensus forecast, defined as the average or median of individual forecasts. We
argue, however, that the fraction of forecasts that miss on the same side does a superior job
of explaining stock returns than the consensus error. We develop a model to show that the
reason is that when analysts forecasts are biased the consensus forecast is more sensitive to
this bias than the fraction of same-sided misses. While our paper has focused on earnings
forecasts, the methodology we have laid out can be applied equally well to any type of
forecasts such as on macro-variables. We believe that our new methodology can be used to
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improve the precision of event studies of capital market efficiency which are a most basic
tool for economists.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We directly compute the correlation of CE with the market surprise S:
Cor[CE, S] =
Cov[CE, S]√
Var[CE] · Var[S]
=
σ2A√
(σ2A +
σ2F
N
) · σ2A
=
1√
1 + r2F/N
, (30)
where rF = σF/σA is the ratio between the standard deviation of forecasts and the actual.
We then rewrite FOM as:
FOM =
#{i < S} −#{i > S}
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Mi, (31)
where
Mi =
 1 if i < S−1 if i > S (32)
If we work out the math,
Cov[FOM, S] = E[S(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Mi)]− E[S] · E[FOM]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[S · (Ii<S − Ii>S)]
= E
[
S ·
(
Φ(
S
σF
)−
(
1− Φ( S
σF
)
))]
= 2σFE[X · Φ(X)], (33)
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where Φ(·) is the cdf of standard normal and X ∼ N (0, 1/r2F ). Similarly,
Var[FOM] =
4
N
E[Φ(X)(1− Φ(X))] + 4Var[Φ(X)]. (34)
Combining (33) and (34), we have
Cor[FOM, S] =
rFE[X · Φ(X)]√
E[Φ(X)(1− Φ(X))]/N + Var[Φ(X)] , (35)
where X ∼ N (0, 1/r2F ).
To show the second half, first note that (9) goes to l(rF ) = rFE[X·Φ(X)]√
Var[Φ(X)]
as N → ∞.
The limit l(rF ) can be rewritten as Cov(X,Φ(X))√
Var(X)
√
Var(Φ(X))
, which is the correlation between a
normal random variable X and its transformation Φ(X). This takes the value 1 if and only
if Φ(X) = a+ b ·X for some constants a and b, however using integration by parts
Φ(X) =
1
2
+
1√
2pi
e−X
2/2
(
X +
X3
3
+
X5
3 · 5 + · · ·+
X2n+1
3 · 5 · · · (2n+ 1) + · · ·
)
,
Φ(X) =
1
2
+
1√
2pi
e−X
2/2
∞∑
k=0
X2k+1
(2k + 1)!
,
which is nonlinear in X. Therefore l(rF ) must be strictly less than 1. In other words, for N
large and when there is no bias, CE is a better measure of S than FOM. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.
Similar calculations to those leading to (8) yields a formula for (10). Similar calculations
to those leading to (9) yields a formula for the correlation of FOM with S:
Cor[FOM, S] =
rFE[X · Φω(X, Y )]√
E[Φω(X, Y )(1− Φω(X, Y ))]/N + Var[Φω(X, Y )]
, (36)
where Φω(X, Y ) = ω0Φ(X) + ω1Φ(X˜ − Y ), X˜ = X√
1+r2b/r
2
F
, X ∼ N (0, 1/r2F ), and Y ∼
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N (0, r2B
r2F+r
2
b
) independent of X. To derive the lower bound, first observe that
Cov[FOM, S] = 2ω0σFE[X · Φ(X)] + 2ω1σFE[X · Φ(X˜ − Y )], (37)
where the first term in ω0 is positive and the second term is non-negative because X and
Φ(X˜ − Y ) are both monotonically increasing in X when given Y and must have positive
covariance. Therefore,
Cov[FOM, S] ≥ 2ω0σFE[X · Φ(X)]
= ω0 · Cov[FOM, S|ω1 = 0]. (38)
This means the covariance is at least a fraction of that in the ideal case. The more unbi-
ased forecasts (the larger ω0), the more positive relationship preserved. Consequently, the
correlation between FOM and S is bounded from below
Cor[FOM, S] =
Cov[FOM, S]√
Var[FOM] · Var[S]
≥ 2ω0σFE[X · Φ(X)]
σA ·
√
Var[FOM]
≥ 2ω0rFE[X · Φ(X)], (39)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the variance of any bounded random
variable in [a, b] is at most (b− a)2/4 and FOM takes value between −1 and 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 3:
We first derive the following set of relationships:
Cor[f ∗(U), S] ≤ max
h
Cor[S, h(U,A)] =
√
E[E[S|U,A]]2
E[S2]
.
The calculation of the first inequality follows from the discussion in the main body. The
calculation for the second equality is as follows. By definition, where h∗ is the optimal
33
functional,
Cor(S, h∗) = Cov(S, h∗)/
√
Var(S) ∗ Var(h∗).
and
Cov(S, h∗) = E[S h∗]− E[S]E[h∗] = E[S E[S|U, A]] = E[E[S|U, A]]2
because E[S] = E[h∗] = 0. The denominator
√
Var(S) ∗ Var(h∗) =
√
E[S2]E[h∗2].
Note that E[h∗2] = E[E[S|U, A]]2 by definition. Taking the ratio, we get the third term.
It can then be shown that
E[S|U,A] = σ
2
1
σ2F
∑
i∈A
Ui +
σ21
σ22
∑
i/∈A
Ui,
where
σ−21 =
1
σ2A
+
|A|
σ2F
+
1
σ2F+σ
2
b
N−|A| + σ
2
B
, and σ−22 =
1
N−|A|
σ2F+σ
2
b
N−|A| + σ
2
B
.
To see this, note that the joint density of U, S and B (where B is the aggregate bias
shock) conditional on A is (ignoring the normalization constant):
exp{− S
2
2σ2A
} · exp{− 1
σ2F
∑
i∈A
(Ui − S)2} · exp{− B
2
2σ2B
} · exp{− 1
σ23
∑
i/∈A
(Ui −B − S)2},
where σ23 = σ2F + σ2b . The last two terms related to B can be written as
exp
{
−1
2
[
(
1
σ2B
+
N − |A|
σ23
)B2 − 2
σ23
∑
i/∈A
(Ui − S) + 1
σ23
∑
i/∈A
(Ui − S)2
]}
.
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Let σ−24 =
1
σ2B
+ N−|A|
σ23
. Integrating the above expression with respect to B, we obtain
exp
− 1σ23
∑
i/∈A
(Ui − S)2 + σ
2
4
σ43
[∑
i/∈A
(Ui − S)
]2 .
Therefore, the joint density of U and S conditional on A is
exp
− S22σ2A − 12σ2F
∑
i∈A
(Ui − S)2 − 1
2σ23
∑
i/∈A
(Ui − S)2 + σ
2
4
2σ43
[∑
i/∈A
(Ui − S)
]2 .
Combining the terms related to S, we have
exp
{
−1
2
[
1
σ2A
+
|A|
σ2F
+
N − |A|
σ23
− σ
2
4
σ43
(N − |A|)2
]
S2
}
· exp
{[
1
σ2F
∑
i∈A
(Ui − S) + 1
σ23
∑
i/∈A
(Ui − S)− σ
2
4
σ43
∑
i/∈A
Ui(N − |A|)
]
S
}
.
Therefore, the conditional distribution of S given U and A is
N
(
σ21
σ2F
∑
i∈A
Ui +
σ21
σ22
∑
i/∈A
Ui, σ
2
1
)
,
where
σ−21 =
1
σ2A
+
|A|
σ2F
+
N − |A|
σ23
− σ
2
4
σ43
(N − |A|)2 = 1
σ2A
+
|A|
σ2F
+
1
σ2F+σ
2
b
N−|A| + σ
2
B
,
and σ−22 =
1
σ23
− σ
2
4(N − |A|)
σ43
=
1
N−|A|
σ2F+σ
2
b
N−|A| + σ
2
B
.
Since all of the N forecasts depend on a common aggregated bias B, the variance σ2B is
not scaled by the number of forecasts. As σ2B grows, we have
lim
σ2B→∞
E[S|U,A] = 1
r2F + |A|
∑
i∈A
Ui.
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Denoting the above as h∗, we can compute its second moment using the law of total variance,
E[h∗2] = E[Var[h∗|S,A]] + Var[E[h∗|S,A]]
= E
[
1
(r2F + |A|)2
|A|σ2F
]
+ Var
[
1
r2F + |A|
|A|S
]
= E
[
1
1 + r2F/|A|
]
σ2A.
Recall that Cor[FOM, S] ≥ 2ω0E[ZΦ(Z/rF )]. Taken together we have shown Equation (29).
QED
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Table 1 (cont’d): Summary Statistics
Panel B: Correlation matrix (CE based on mean consensus)
CE DISP Rank(CE) Rank(DISP) FOM IActual<All IActual>All
CE 1
DISP -0.5184 1
Rank(CE) 0.284 -0.0414 1
Rank(DISP) -0.1015 0.138 -0.1175 1
FOM 0.2414 -0.0402 0.8103 -0.1881 1
IActual<All -0.247 0.0195 -0.4774 0.073 -0.6032 1
IActual>All 0.1305 -0.0291 0.5317 -0.1722 0.597 -0.1896 1
Panel C: Correlation matrix (CE based on median consensus)
CE DISP Rank(CE) Rank(DISP) FOM IActual<All IActual>All
CE 1
DISP -0.124 1
Rank(CE) 0.2853 -0.025 1
Rank(DISP) -0.1002 0.138 -0.0547 1
FOM 0.2672 -0.0402 0.8473 -0.1881 1
IActual<All -0.2746 0.0195 -0.4709 0.073 -0.6032 1
IActual>All 0.1357 -0.0291 0.5231 -0.1722 0.597 -0.1896 1
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Table 5: Number of Analysts, CAR, FOM, out-of-bound dummies, and Rank(CE)
This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of the sensitivity of earnings announcement stock
returns (CAR) to Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All by further classifying stocks into 4 groups
based on the number of analyst coverage. Group 1 includes stocks with 5 to 9 analysts, group 2 is 10 to 14,
group 3 is 15 to 19, and group 4 is stocks with more than 20 analysts. The dependent variable is CAR. The
independent variables are Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All, as defined in Table 2. In Panel A,
Rank(CE) is calculated based on mean consensus. In panel B, Rank(CE) is based on median consensus. All
standard errors are clustered by stocks. t statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Rank(CE) is based on mean consensus
N = 5 to 9 N = 10 to 14 N = 15 to 19 N ≥ 20
(1) Rank(CE) 0.00465*** 0.00420*** 0.00356*** 0.00282***
(22.03) (12.54) (8.28) (7.92)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.032 0.026 0.019 0.018
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(2) FOM 0.0226*** 0.0213*** 0.0187*** 0.0153***
(26.77) (16.04) (11.32) (10.72)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.032
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(3) IActual<All -0.0210*** -0.0218*** -0.0271*** -0.0133***
(-11.84) (-6.33) (-5.74) (-3.85)
IActual>All 0.0272*** 0.0287*** 0.0202*** 0.0222***
(18.54) (12.88) (6.80) (7.60)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.038 0.036 0.025 0.020
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(4) Rank(CE) 0.000188 -0.000345 -0.000909 -0.000804
(0.52) (-0.63) (-1.13) (-1.43)
FOM 0.0219*** 0.0224*** 0.0216*** 0.0179***
(15.01) (10.26) (6.94) (7.80)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.032
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(5) Rank(CE) 0.00212*** 0.00184*** 0.00179*** 0.00175***
(7.56) (4.56) (3.54) (4.30)
IActual<All -0.0138*** -0.0152*** -0.0206*** -0.00697
(-7.04) (-4.11) (-4.09) (-1.91)
IActual>All 0.0198*** 0.0227*** 0.0146*** 0.0167***
(11.34) (8.85) (4.40) (5.20)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.041 0.038 0.028 0.024
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
42
Table 5 (cont’d): Number of Analysts, CAR, FOM, out-of-bound dummies, and
Rank(CE)
Panel B: Rank(CE) based on median consensus
N = 5 to 9 N = 10 to 14 N = 15 to 19 N ≥ 20
(1) Rank(CE) 0.00869*** 0.00808*** 0.00712*** 0.00562***
(24.57) (14.59) (9.84) (9.56)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.039 0.034 0.028 0.025
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(2) FOM 0.0226*** 0.0213*** 0.0187*** 0.0153***
(26.77) (16.04) (11.32) (10.72)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.032
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(3) IActual<All -0.0210*** -0.0218*** -0.0271*** -0.0133***
(-11.84) (-6.33) (-5.74) (-3.85)
IActual>All 0.0272*** 0.0287*** 0.0202*** 0.0222***
(18.54) (12.88) (6.80) (7.60)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.038 0.036 0.025 0.020
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(4) Rank(CE) 0.00258*** 0.00186 0.00147 0.000241
(3.70) (1.84) (1.07) (0.21)
FOM 0.0171*** 0.0174*** 0.0156*** 0.0148***
(10.25) (7.15) (5.01) (5.25)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.045 0.040 0.034 0.032
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(5) Rank(CE) 0.00532*** 0.00482*** 0.00480*** 0.00423***
(11.47) (7.35) (5.85) (6.28)
IActual<All -0.0104*** -0.0117** -0.0166*** -0.00402
(-5.30) (-3.17) (-3.36) (-1.09)
IActual>All 0.0164*** 0.0193*** 0.0114*** 0.0146***
(9.53) (7.61) (3.50) (4.57)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.045 0.042 0.034 0.029
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
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Table 6: Number of Analysts, POSTCAR, FOM, out-of-bound dummies, and
Rank(CE)
This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of the sensitivity of post earnings announcement
stock returns to Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All by further classifying stocks into 4 groups
based on the number of analyst coverage. Group 1 includes stocks with 5 to 9 analysts, group 2 is 10
to 14, group 3 is 15 to 19, and group 4 is stocks with more than 20 analysts. The dependent variable is
POSTCAR. The independent variables are Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All, as defined in
Table 3. In Panel A, Rank(CE) is calculated based on mean consensus. In panel B, Rank(CE) is based on
median consensus. All standard errors are clustered by stocks. t statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Rank(CE) based on mean consensus
N = 5 to 9 N = 10 to 14 N = 15 to 19 N ≥ 20
(1) Rank(CE) 0.00170* 0.00223 0.00144 0.00282*
(2.16) (1.88) (0.98) (2.20)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(2) FOM 0.0143*** 0.0143** 0.0121* 0.0110*
(4.60) (3.05) (2.16) (2.25)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(3) IActual<All -0.0125 -0.0210* -0.0137 -0.00796
(-1.93) (-1.98) (-0.89) (-0.67)
IActual>All 0.0183*** 0.0132 0.00205 0.00992
(3.32) (1.67) (0.20) (0.94)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.019
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(4) Rank(CE) -0.00401** -0.00203 -0.00332 0.00173
(-2.84) (-1.03) (-1.29) (0.79)
FOM 0.0281*** 0.0210** 0.0230* 0.00540
(5.06) (2.73) (2.33) (0.65)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(5) Rank(CE) -0.00124 0.000426 0.00110 0.00290
(-1.11) (0.28) (0.60) (1.86)
IActual<All -0.0167* -0.0195 -0.00968 0.00258
(-2.25) (-1.63) (-0.58) (0.20)
IActual>All 0.0227*** 0.0118 -0.00140 0.000805
(3.38) (1.28) (-0.12) (0.07)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
44
Table 6 (cont’d): Number of Analysts, POSTCAR, FOM, out-of-bound dummies,
and Rank(CE)
Panel B: Rank(CE) based on median consensus
N = 5 to 9 N = 10 to 14 N = 15 to 19 N ≥ 20
(1) Rank(CE) 0.00419** 0.00477* 0.00394 0.00550*
(3.17) (2.36) (1.58) (2.55)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.021
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(2) FOM 0.0143*** 0.0143** 0.0121* 0.0110*
(4.60) (3.05) (2.16) (2.25)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(3) IActual<All -0.0125 -0.0210* -0.0137 -0.00796
(-1.93) (-1.98) (-0.89) (-0.67)
IActual>All 0.0183*** 0.0132 0.00205 0.00992
(3.32) (1.67) (0.20) (0.94)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.019
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(4) Rank(CE) -0.00392 -0.00138 -0.00178 0.00580
(-1.49) (-0.35) (-0.37) (1.34)
FOM 0.0226*** 0.0171 0.0158 -0.000834
(3.69) (1.90) (1.44) (-0.08)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(5) Rank(CE) 0.000666 0.00245 0.00415 0.00597*
(0.37) (0.93) (1.34) (2.28)
IActual<All -0.0111 -0.0158 -0.00463 0.00519
(-1.52) (-1.34) (-0.28) (0.40)
IActual>All 0.0170** 0.00848 -0.00553 -0.000914
(2.58) (0.91) (-0.48) (-0.08)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
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Table 7: Sensitivity of forecast revision to Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All and
IActual>All
This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of the sensitivity of analysts’ forecast revision to
Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All. The dependent variable is the forecast revision (the difference
in mean (median) consensus between two adjacent fiscal years). The independent variables are Rank(CE)
(the rank score of consensus errors, from 1 to 10 for Rank(CE) based on mean consensus and 1 to 6 for
Rank(CE) based on median consensus), FOM ( KN − MN , where K (M) is the number of forecasts strictly
smaller (greater) than the actual earnings, and N is the total number of analysts), IActual<All (a dummy
variable which equals 1 when all analysts’ forecasts are higher than the actual earnings), and IActual>All
(a dummy variable which equals 1 when all analysts’ forecasts are lower than the actual earnings). 27,701
observations are in each of the regression models.
Panel A: Rank(CE) is based on mean consensus
(1) (3) (2) (5) (4)
Rank(CE) 0.189*** 0.121*** 0.165***
(27.27) (10.28) (18.22)
FOM 0.736*** 0.334***
(29.00) (7.78)
IActual<All -0.676*** -0.0992
(-11.60) (-1.53)
IActual>All 0.792*** 0.251***
(17.97) (4.89)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.035 0.033 0.021 0.037 0.036
Panel B: Rank(CE) is based on median consensus
(1) (3) (2) (5) (4)
Rank(CE) 0.182*** 0.103*** 0.155***
(26.63) (7.75) (17.47)
FOM 0.736*** 0.369***
(29.00) (7.57)
IActual<All -0.676*** -0.125
(-11.60) (-1.92)
IActual>All 0.792*** 0.283***
(17.97) (5.64)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.033 0.033 0.021 0.035 0.034
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Table 8: Parametric-dependent (bias and precision adjusted) CE and Rank(CE)
compared to parametric-free FOM for explaining earnings announcement
returns
This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of the sensitivity of earnings announcement stock
returns (CAR) to consensus errors (CE) or Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All, where CE and
Rank(CE) are calculated based on parametric dependent method using a bias and precision adjusted consen-
sus. The dependent variable is CAR (cumulative abnormal return from trading day -1 to 1 around annual
earnings announcement dates). All other independent variables are as described in Table 2. In Panel A,
we report regression coefficients of parametric-dependent-CE, FOM, and two out-of-bound dummies. Panel
B reports regression coefficients of parametric-dependent-Rank(CE), FOM, and two out-of-bound dummies.
21,370 observations are in each of the regression models. All standard errors are clustered by stocks. t
statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Parametric-dependent-CE and FOM
(1) (2) (3)
CE 0.00000344 0.00000563 0.00000354
(0.41) (0.65) (0.45)
FOM 0.0210***
(28.67)
IActual<All -0.0208***
(-13.26)
IActual>All 0.0248***
(20.61)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.001 0.048 0.039
Panel B: Parametric-dependent-Rank(CE) and FOM
(1) (2) (3)
Rank(CE) 0.000557** -0.000324 -0.000139
(3.20) (-1.88) (-0.81)
FOM 0.0212***
(28.73)
IActual<All -0.0210***
(-13.28)
IActual>All 0.0249***
(20.64)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.001 0.048 0.039
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Table 9. Lower bounds of relative efficiency of FOM in comparison with the
ideal but infeasible measure (N = 10).
ω0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0
rF = 0 0.099 0.243 0.399 0.559 0.718 0.798
rF = 0.5 0.096 0.228 0.367 0.509 0.651 0.723
rF = 1 0.092 0.202 0.312 0.423 0.536 0.592
rF = 2 0.086 0.169 0.243 0.315 0.386 0.422
rF =∞ 0.080 0.138 0.178 0.211 0.239 0.252
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Figure 1: The distribution of FOM over the whole sample. FOM is the fraction of misses
defined as K
N
− M
N
, where K(M) is the number of forecasts strictly smaller (greater) than the
actual earnings, and N is the total number of analysts.
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N = 5 to 9 (53% of whole sample)
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N = 10 to 19 (35% of whole sample)
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Figure 2: The distribution of FOM over the whole sample and conditional on different
number of analysts N . FOM is the fraction of misses defined as K
N
− M
N
, where K(M) is the
number of forecasts strictly smaller (greater) than the actual earnings, and N is the total
number of analysts.
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Figure 3: The time series of the percentage of misses on the same side.
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Figure 4: Average CAR against Rank(CE). CAR is the cumulative abnormal return from
trading day −1 to 1 around annual earnings announcement dates, and Rank(CE) is the rank
score 1 to 10 of consensus errors CE based on mean consensus.
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Figure 5: Average CAR against FOM. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return from trading
day −1 to 1 around annual earnings announcement dates, and FOM is the fraction of misses
defined as K
N
− M
N
, where K(M) is the number of forecasts strictly smaller (greater) than the
actual earnings, and N is the total number of analysts.
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Figure 6: Average POSTCAR against Rank(CE). POSTCAR is the cumulative abnormal
return from trading day 2 to 126 post annual earnings announcement dates, and Rank(CE)
is the rank score 1 to 10 of consensus errors CE based on mean consensus.
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Figure 7: Average POSTCAR against FOM. POSTCAR is the cumulative abnormal return
from trading day 2 to 126 post annual earnings announcement dates, and FOM is the fraction
of misses defined as K
N
− M
N
, where K(M) is the number of forecasts strictly smaller (greater)
than the actual earnings, and N is the total number of analysts.
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Supplementary Internet Appendix
A Numerical Calculations and Extensions
In this section, we provide more color on how bias affects the relative performance of CE,
Rank(CE) and FOM and why FOM is a robust measure of surprises S.
A.1 Unbiased Forecasts Benchmark: ω1 = 0
We start with the unbiased benchmark. In the earlier model section, we had established some
results for N large but have also done extensive calculations over wide parameter ranges.
To evaluate their relative performance (CE compared to FOM), we can compute the exact
value of (8) and (9) for any given pair of parameters. Appendix Figure 1 shows the contour
plot of the correlation between CE and S minus the correlation between FOM and S (i.e.,
Cor[CE, S]− Cor[FOM, S]) as a function of rF and N . Although we cannot prove it in full
generality, we searched over a sufficiently large space with realistic parameter values and the
difference stays positive, so we conclude that CE is superior than FOM for practical use in
this ideal case.
The relative performance of CE and FOM changes with rF and N in a nonlinear manner.
But we can try to get some intuition and a flavor of what drives this difference in performance.
If we take a horizontal slice of this contour by fixingN , the difference is the smallest at around
rF = 1 and when rF is large (see the bottom right corner). The intuition behind the first
observation is that FOM tries to gauge one realization of S by using N realized noise as a
benchmark, i.e., counting how many i’s are above or below it. If S and i’s have roughly
the same distribution, it gives the most accurate account for the location of S in its own
unobserved distribution. This in our case leads to rF = σF/σA ∼ 1 (the exact maximal point
depends on N). On the other hand, as rF increases, the correlation of both measures drop
and they become equally bad. Appendix Figure 2 shows the pattern when N = 10, which is
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rather representative of different N ’s.
A.2 Biased Forecasts: ω1 > 0
While CE can be large simply due to the existence of one very negative Fi, FOM is much
less affected because each observation only contributes as 1 or −1 in the sum (31) regardless
of its magnitude. One consequence is that CE and FOM are no longer highly correlated.
While we observe a rather low correlation (around 0.28) in earnings data, which is also due
to other reasons as we argue in Section A.5, here we use simulations to reveal part of the
dynamic caused by biased forecasts. We simulate data according to the model and calculate
the correlations using 50, 000 samples, where the key parameters ω1 and rB vary over their
range, and the others fixed at N = 20, rF = 1/2 and rb = rB/5. Appendix Figure 3 shows
how the correlation decreases with rB, the relative uncertainty level of the bias component
B. In terms of ω1, recall it is the proportion of biased forecasts, so the correlation first
decreases with the introduction of biased forecasts as soon as ω1 becomes nonzero, and then
picks up when both measures get equally bad.
Along with the lower correlation between these two measures, the discrepancy between
their performance measuring market surprise also widens, mainly due to their different resis-
tance to bias. We have shown earlier (Proposition 2) that FOM will eventually outperform
CE as bias becomes more significant, because FOM’s correlation with S has a positive lower
bound whereas Cor(CE, S) can be reduced to zero quickly. Indeed this is what we observe
in simulation studies. As an illustration, again let the key parameters ω1 and rB vary over
their range, with the others fixed at rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20. We directly com-
pute the correlation between CE and S in (10) and simulate 100, 000 samples of X and
Y to compute the correlation between FOM and S in (36). Appendix Figure 4 shows a
representative pattern of their relative performance as a function of ω1 and rB, where the
difference between Cor[CE, S] and Cor[FOM, S] becomes negative (i.e., FOM outperforms)
as the relative dispersion of bias rB = σB/σA increases.
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A.2.1 CE and Rank(CE)
In practice, people use Rank(CE), i.e., sort CE into 10 deciles in order to be robust to outliers.
However, this global adjustment may not work in the presence of bias. For example, one
single large biased forecast can still move CE from decile 10 down to decile 1 and distort
the ordering. Appendix Figure 5 shows a representative pattern of the difference in the
performance of Rank(CE) and FOM (i.e., Cor[Rank(CE), S]−Cor[FOM, S]) as a function of
ω1 and rB with the same set of parameters as in Section A.2, where each Cor[Rank(CE), S]
is computed using 50,000 simulated samples. Comparing with Appendix Figure 4, there is
some improvement when rB is not too large. However, the essence of the analysis on CE
carries over to Rank(CE) because when CE is greatly contaminated, the coding of Rank(CE)
does not help much: the damage is already done. In this sense, FOM measure does the
robustness adjustment on a local level, so the impact from bias is alleviated when aggregating
N forecasts, instead of afterwards. Therefore, FOM improves over Rank(CE) for the same
reason as it does over CE, the reason being their sensitivity to large bias. That being said,
Rank(CE) does have better property when treating the few outliers that overthrow CE,
and Section A.5 develops this aspect of the relationship between CE and Rank(CE) in an
extended model.
A.3 Winsorized Mean and Median
In order to be robust to the noisy forecasts, one may also Winsorize the forecasts. For
example, a 5% Winsorization would set all forecasts below the 5th percentile set to the 5th
percentile, and data above the 95th percentile set to the 95th percentile. The average of the
resulting data is the Winsorized mean of forecasts. Similarly, we can define the Winsorized
consensus error as
CEwinλ = A− F¯winλ ,
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where λ is the percentage of data on each tail being replaced. Note that when λ = 50%, the
Winsorized mean becomes median:
CEwin50% = CEmed = A−median(Fi).
However, such measures do not show much, if any, improvement in our regression results of
earnings announcement event study. This is not surprising because although Winsorization is
designed to remove the two tails in a set of forecasts, it is by no means equivalent to removing
the biased ones. Since the realization of bias is unknown in each draw, it is impossible for
Winsorization to correctly pick up all the bad forecasts without sacrificing the good ones. In
the same spirit as the analysis of consensus errors, the Winsorized measures by definition still
strongly depend on the magnitude of forecasts, which inevitably leads to their vulnerability
to bias. The more volatile B is, the harder it is for Winsorization to achieve consistent
performance. Appendix Figure 6 illustrates how the performance drops with increasing rB
through 5000 simulations, where the other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3,
rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
Furthermore, the performance also depends on the fraction of biased forecasts and the
choice of λ for Winsorization. Unfortunately, the fraction of biased forecasts ω1 is usually
unknown in practice and may even be varying, so it is hard if not impossible to set λ,
the single important parameter for Winsorization, and an inappproriate choice might result
in undesirable performance. This is illustrated in Appendix Figure 7, where the relative
performance of different Winsorized measures changes with the fraction of biased forecasts
ω1, and the other parameters in the model are set as rB = 10, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and
N = 20.
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A.4 Remark on the Model
A key assumption in our model is that for each stock a fraction of analysts are biased.
Recall that under our modelling, the forecasts come from a mixture composed of two normal
distributions, one centered around the unknown market expectation e and the other biased
by a magnitude of the realized B. While the aggregated bias magnitude B can be huge or
moderate, ω1 the weight of the biased distribution in the mixture is with respect to N so the
number of biased analysts scales with the total number and makes the law of large numbers
fail. In this normal mixture framework, the bias component is essential and we have shown
how it drives the behaviour of different measures that is consistent with our observations.
If we remove the bias part of the modelling and instead introduce bad forecasts by having
large variance in one of the distributions, it will fail to represent some important features in
the real data. More specifically, suppose the forecasts are given by
Fi = e+ i, (40)
where i’s follow a mixture of two normal distributions: N (0, σ20) with probability ω0 and
N (0, σ21) with probability ω1 = 1 − ω0, and σ21 > σ20. Notice that this is actually a limiting
case of our specification (3) by setting σB = 0, which means B is always 0 so that its impact
disappears. Under this alternative modelling, even though individual forecasts can be very
volatile, the variance of the average forecast error is given by:
Var[
1
N
N∑
i=1
i] =
1
N
(ω0σ
2
0 + ω1σ
2
1), (41)
so CE still converges to S by the law of large numbers. That is, although σ21 can be large, the
distortion from fat-tails is greatly discounted and the variance decreases linearly in N , unlike
in the original model the variance of the average noise never vanishes no matter how big N
is. This implies that CE or Rank(CE) should be better for larger N under the alternative
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model, which does not quite match what we see in the real data (recall Table 5).
Furthermore, in the absence of random bias all the forecasts are centered around the
real market expectation e, so it is much easier for Winsorisation to filter the bad forecasts.
As a comparative example to Appendix Figure 6, Appendix Figure 8 illustrates the much
stronger performance of Winsorized mean and median through 5000 simulations, which is
again different from what we see in the empirical study and undermines the validity of this
alternative modelling.
A.5 Extension Allowing for Outliers in CE
Although by comparing Appendix Figure 4 and Appendix 5 we show that Rank(CE) has
slight improvement over CE, so far in our analysis they play a very similar role. Consequently,
when our model generates a low correlation between CE and FOM, Rank(CE) and FOM
are also much less correlated. However in real data we find the correlation between CE
and Rank(CE) is merely over 0.28, which leads to a low Cor(CE,FOM) around 0.24 and
a rather high Cor(Rank(CE),FOM) over 0.81. As we further delve into data, we find rare
events when most analysts or even everyone miss by quite a margin, which produces huge
CE that has a magnitude multiple times more than the regular majority (e.g., the 3% on
two tails is 30 times of the central 97% in average absolute value). Note that our CE is
scaled by stock price and controlled for split, so this is not an issue about firm heterogeneity.
These large values are able to drive the correlation between CE and other measures down.
For example, Appendix Figure 9 shows how the extreme tails of CE diminish its covariation
with Rank(CE) in the regular region, that is, when we zoom in and conditional on Rank(CE)
being 2 to 9 only, the correlation bounces back to 0.72.
Recall that in our model ω1 is a constant and B follows a normal distribution, we clearly
are not able to generate the tail events of huge CE within a reasonable range of parameter
values. In order to close this gap with the real data, we introduce a tail event scenario with
a small probability. That is, with probability 1 − θ the forecasts follow the original model
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as in (3); with probability θ which is supposed to be very small, all the forecasts are off by
a magnitude possibly huge:
Fi = e+ b˜i + i, i = 1, · · · , N (42)
where i ∼ N (0, σ2F ), and conditional on B˜ ∼ N (0, σ2B˜), we have b˜i ∼ N (B˜, σ2b ). σB˜ should be
large relatively to σB, and we use σB˜ = 30·σB which seems a reasonable scale to represent the
real data. As argued above, this formulation helps to explain the low correlation between
CE and Rank(CE) as well as FOM, and its poor performance as a proxy of the market
surprise S. On the other hand, the impact on Rank(CE) and FOM is very limited as long as
θ is small. Since huge values of CE only translate to the boundary points in Rank(CE) and
FOM, their distortion is not magnified by the magnitude. By a similar argument as in the
case of FOM with respect to biased forecasts, the behaviour of Rank(CE) and FOM should
not deviate too much from their respective θ = 0 case.
We now confirm our hypothesis through simulation studies. Throughout this section, the
correlations are computed using 100, 000 simulated samples for each pair of parameters θ and
rB, with the others fixed at ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20. Appendix Figure 10
and Appendix 11 show how the correlation between CE and other measures decreases dra-
matically with the introduction of θ. On the other hand, the relationship between Rank(CE)
and FOM are rather stable, indicated by the horizontal stripes in Appendix Figure 12. In
terms of the performance as a proxy of market surprise, the gap between FOM and CE
widens because of the tail scenario that undermines CE (Appendix Figure 13), while the
improvement of FOM over Rank(CE) remains as in θ = 0 case (Appendix Figure 14).
A.6 Extended Model
Our model above assumes that the market’s expectation conditions on information outside
the set of analyst forecasts. But we can model the market’s expectation as dependent just
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on the set of analysts’ forecasts and obtain the same results.
Suppose now that A ∼ N (0, σ2A) for simplicity. There are i = 1, ..., N forecasts. We then
assume that individual forecasts i is given by
Fi =
 A+ i with prob. ω0A+ bi + i with prob. ω1 = 1− ω0 (43)
where i ∼ N (0, σ2F ) and is uncorrelated with the randomness in A. Each forecast is unbiased
with probability ω0, and is contaminated by an individual bias term bi with probability
ω1 = 1− ω0. We model the bias in the same manner as before. For each set of N forecasts
an aggregated bias level B ∼ N (0, σ2B) is drawn first, and conditional on this realized B
individual bias bi follows N (B, σ2b ).
We assume that investors are able to de-bias whereas the econometrician cannot. Hence,
the market’s posterior of A is given by
Aˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
F ∗i , (44)
where F ∗i = A + i is the debiased forecasts. This follows from the usual Kalman Filtering
results in linear-normal models where each forecast can be interpreted as a linear signal of
the actual A. Since each signal has equal precision, there is then equal weighting of the
signals in forming the posterior Aˆ. The market surprise then is given by
S = A− Aˆ (45)
Notice that CE is now given by
CE = A− 1
N
N∑
i=1
Fi (46)
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and FOM is now given by
FOM =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(IFi<A − IFi>A) (47)
We want to compare again the correlation of CE and FOM with the market surprise S,
respectively,
We can calculate that
Cor(CE, S) =
1√
1 + ω0ω1r2B + ω1r
2
b + ω
2
1r
2
BN
(48)
where rB = σB/σF and rb = σb/σF . We can also show that
Cor(FOM, S) =
ω0
1√
2pi
+ ω1E[XΦ(X˜ − Y )]√
ω0
2
(1− ω0
2
) + ω21E[Φ(X˜ − Y )(1− Φ(X˜ − Y ))] +Nω21Var[Φ(X˜ − Y )]
(49)
where X ∼ N (0, 1) and X˜ = X/rb which is orthogonal to Y ∼ N (0, r
2
B
r2b
).
Since Cor(FOM, S) ≥ w0
√
2/pi√
1+ω21N
, it follows then that if rB gets large, then Cor(CE, S)
drops below Cor(FOM, S). This then confirms our results in our baseline model.
64
0.05
0.10
0.15
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10
rF
N
Appendix Figure 1: The contour plot of Cor[CE, S]−Cor[FOM, S] as a function of rF and
N in unbiased forecasts benchmark case. The contour value is the difference between the
correlations of consensus errors CE and fraction of misses FOM to S the market surprise,
the y-axis is N the number of analysts, and the x-axis is rF = σF/σA the ratio between the
standard deviation of forecasts and the actual (shown in log-scale).
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Appendix Figure 2: The comparison between the correlations of consensus errors CE and
fraction of misses FOM to S the market surprise as a function of rF for fixed number of
analysts N = 10, where rF = σF/σA is the ratio between the standard deviation of forecasts
and the actual (shown in log-scale).
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Appendix Figure 3: The contour plot of Cor[CE,FOM] as a function of the key parameters
ω1 and rB in biased forecasts case. The contour value is the correlation between consensus
errors CE and fraction of misses FOM, the y-axis is ω1 the proportion of biased forecasts,
and the x-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias
and the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are set as rF = 1/2,
rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 4: The contour plot of Cor[CE, S]−Cor[FOM, S] as a function of the key
parameters ω1 and rB in biased forecasts case. The contour value is the difference between
the correlations of consensus errors CE and fraction of misses FOM to S the market surprise,
the y-axis is ω1 the proportion of biased forecasts, and the x-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio
between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The
other parameters in the model are set as rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 5: The contour plot of Cor[Rank(CE), S]− Cor[FOM, S] as a function of
the key parameters ω1 and rB in biased forecasts case. The contour value is the difference
between the correlations of the rank score of consensus errors Rank(CE) and fraction of
misses FOM to S the market surprise, the y-axis is ω1 the proportion of biased forecasts,
and the x-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias
and the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are set as rF = 1/2,
rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 6: The comparison between the correlations of fraction of misses FOM
and different Winsorized measures CEwinλ to S the market surprise as a function of rB in
biased forecasts case, where rB = σB/σA is the ratio between the standard deviation of
aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are
set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 7: The comparison between the correlations of fraction of misses FOM
and different winsorized measures CEwinλ to S the market surprise as a function of ω1 in
biased forecasts case, where ω1 is the proportion of biased forecasts. The other parameters
in the model are set as rB = 10, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 8: The comparison between the correlations of fraction of misses FOM
and different winsorized measures CEwinλ to S the market surprise as a function of σ1/σA
(shown in log-scale) under the alternative modelling without introducing bias, where σ1 is
the variance of bad forecasts. The other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3,
σ0/σA = 1/2 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 9: Average CE against Rank(CE) in earnings data. Left: over the whole
sample; Right: conditional on Rank(CE) not being in the top or bottom decile.
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Appendix Figure 10: The contour plot of Cor[CE,Rank(CE)] as a function of the key
parameters θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour
value is the correlation between consensus errors CE and its rank score Rank(CE), the x-axis
is θ the probability of tail events as defined in Section A.5, and the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the
ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale).
The other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 11: The contour plot of Cor[CE,FOM] as a function of the key parameters
θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour value is the
correlation between consensus errors CE and fraction of misses FOM, the x-axis is θ the
probability of tail events as defined in Section A.5, and the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio
between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The
other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 12: The contour plot of Cor[FOM,Rank(CE)] as a function of the key
parameters θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour
value is the correlation between fraction of misses FOM and the rank score of consensus
errors Rank(CE), the x-axis is θ the probability of tail events as defined in Section A.5, and
the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and
the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3,
rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 13: The contour plot of Cor[CE, S]−Cor[FOM, S] as a function of the key
parameters θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour
value is the difference between the correlations of consensus errors CE and fraction of misses
FOM to S the market surprise, the x-axis is θ the probability of tail events as defined in
Section A.5, and the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard deviation of
aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are
set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Appendix Figure 14: The contour plot of Cor[Rank(CE), S] − Cor[FOM, S] as a function
of the key parameters θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE.
The contour value is the difference between the correlations of the rank score of consensus
errors Rank(CE) and fraction of misses FOM to S the market surprise, the x-axis is θ the
probability of tail events as defined in Section A.5, and the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio
between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The
other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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